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We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost
of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of
a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore
creates a negative externality on the other plaintiffs. It was shown in Che and
Spier (2007) that failure to internalize this externality can often be exploited by
the defendant. However, if plaintiffs make sequential take-it-or-leave-it settlement
offers, we can show that they will actually be exploited by one of their fellow
plaintiffs rather than by the defendant. Moreover, if litigation is a public good as is
the case in shareholder derivative suits, parties may fail to reach a settlement even
having complete information. This may explain why we observe derivative suits in
the US but not in Europe.
Keywords: litigation, settlement, bargaining, contracting with externalities,
derivative suits, public goods
JEL-Classification: K41, C7, H4
1 Introduction
We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation
is fixed on the plaintiffs’ part. If costs are shared among the members of a suing coaliton,
a plaintiff’s settlement decision creates a negative externality on the other plaintiffs. Che
and Spier (2007) show that under various bargaining set-ups, failure to internalize this
externality can be exploited by the defendant. Compared to the benchmark case without
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externalities, this leads to a redistribution in favour of the defendant and dilutes the
defendant’s incentives to take precaution.
Specifically, if the defendant makes simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it offers to plaintiffs,
the unique coalition proof Nash equilibrium involves a divide and conquer strategy (Segal
(2003)). In order to understand the intuition of the argument, consider the following
numerical example: Assume that there are only two plaintiffs (N = 2). If the suit goes
to trial, they will jointly collect damages of D = 6. Further assume that the cost of
litigation is fixed for both the plaintiffs (CP = 4) and the defendant (CD > 0). In the
benchmark case, plaintiffs will therefore jointly collect damages of 2 (D − CP = 2). If
both plaintiffs go to trial, each will get a payoff of 1 (D/N −CP/N = 1) However, if only
one plaintiff brings suit, his payoff will be negative (D/N − CP = −1). Hence, if one of
the plaintiffs settles, the other plaintiff no longer has a credible threat to sue. It is easy
to see that the defendant can then settle with both plaintiffs by making a settlement offer
of 1 to the settling plaintiff and 0 to the other. Total plaintiff recovery will therefore be
less than in the benchmark (1 < 2).
Che and Spier (2007) show that if the defendant approaches the plaintiffs sequentially,
their exploitation will be even worse. Indeed, as A knows that if he rejects, B will
accept, he will therefore accept a settlement offer of (a little more than) 0. Consequently,
plaintiff B will also get payoff 0 since, on his own, he has no credible threat to sue. Even
more surprisingly, also in the case where plaintiffs make simultaneous take-it-or-leave-it
settlement offers to the defendant, a race to the bottom pushes total plaintiff recovery
down to 0.
In Section 2 we will show that these results are reversed in a setting where the plain-
tiffs make sequential take-it-or-leave-it settlement offers to the defendant. Total plaintiff
recovery will be as in the benchmark. Yet, some plaintiffs can extract higher settlement
payments than others. This is because there exists a plaintiff whose role is pivotal to the
settlement process. By accepting his offer to settle out of court, the defendant can make
absolutely sure that there will be no trial. Hence, the claims of all subsequent plaintiffs
are up for grabs as they no longer have a credible threat to sue. This, however, does
not benefit the defendant. Indeed, the pivotal plaintiff, by making a take-it-or-leave-it
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offer, can skim off the whole exploitation benefit for himself. As for the plaintiffs who
settle before the pivotal plaintiff, it can be shown that they are able to extract the value
of their claims. Interestingly, however, the plaintiff who gets the most is normally an
intermediate plaintiff. Hence, there is no general first-mover advantage.1
Moreover, we show in Section 3 that if litigation is a public good, parties will often
resort to litigation. This is interesting as failure to reach settlement is normally explained
by citing asymmetric information (e.g. Bebchuk, 1984; Nalebuff, 1987; Spier, 1992;
Reinganum and Wilde, 1986; Schweizer, 1989) or overoptimism (e.g. Gould, 1973;
Loewenstein et al., 1993; Bar-Gill, 2006). One prominent example of litigation as a public
good is the case of shareholder derivative suits. These are suits brought by shareholders
against a company’s directors for breach of fiduciary duty. As the claim is technically
a claim of the company, damages are paid to the corporate coffers rather than directly
to shareholders. Hence, suing constitutes a public good as every shareholder benefits
according to his share in the company’s capital, irrespective of whether he has sued or
not.
Grechenig and Sekyra (2007) have pointed to the fact that shareholder derivative
suits are not observed in Europe while they are rather common in the US (Romano,
1991). In their model, the manager’s decision to misappropriate funds is hidden action.
As stealing is assumed to be costly, the damage caused to the company exceeds the
private benefit managers derive from their wrongdoing. If all shareholders were allowed
to sue, as in the US, their combined claims would equal damages caused to the company.
Therefore, the manager would find it impossible to settle with them and still keep a
profit for himself. In such a setting there exists an equilibrium in mixed strategies where
the manager occasionally steals and the shareholders bring suit only some of the time.2
Yet, many European jurisdictions prevent minority shareholders from suing by requiring
them to hold a minimum amount of shares (typically 5 or 10%). Hence, in equilibrium,
1Except in the case where m = N = 2, where the first plaintiff is pivotal.
2If shareholders sued all the time, the manager would be effectively deterred from stealing. However,
this cannot be an equilibrium, as the shareholders would not expend resources to monitor the manager
and to bring suit, knowing that the manager is perfectly honest. On the other hand, not suing at all
cannot be an equilibrium either, because then the shareholders know that they will be expropriated by
a dishonest manager.
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the manager can misappropriate funds, settle with blockholders and make a profit at
the expense of minority shareholders. In such a scenario, no suits occur. As we will
explain in Section 4, our model offers an alternative explanation as to why there are no
derivative suits in Europe which will still hold true even if percentage limits are completely
abandoned. Indeed, it predicts that litigation can be avoided if there exists a dominant
shareholder who wields veto power in the sense that all remaining plaintiffs together
would not have a credible threat to sue because they would find it too expensive. While
it will not often be the case, even in Europe, that the dominance of a single shareholder
is such that he can veto litigation alone, it is realistic to assume that a relatively small
joint group of blockholders is indeed in such a position (e.g. La Porta; Lopez-de-Silanes
and A. Shleifer, 1999). As collusion among them is much easier to organize than in the
dispersed shareholder structure of the US, the likely outcome is that there be settlements
out of court in Europe while claims will proceed to court in the US. Interestingly, the
model also implies that, although minority shareholders do worse in Europe, the cost of
litigation will generally be lower yet achieving the same level of deterrence. Whereas the
results of Grechenig and Sekyra (2007) crucially depend on the director-defendant having
most of the bargaining power, our explanation of the absence of shareholder derivative
suits in Europe assumes that all the bargaining power lies with plaintiffs. In this sense
the two models can be considered as complementary.
2 Sequential TIOLI offers by plaintiffs
Observing differential treatment of plaintiffs does not necessarily mean that they are
exploited by the defendant. As we will show in this section, it might as well be that they
are exploited by one of their fellow plaintiffs. We consider N plaintiffs, who all have a
claim of D/N against a single defendant. For simplicity assume that a plaintiff going
to trial is certain to win. Furthermore, cost of litigation is fixed for both the plaintiffs
(CP > 0) and the defendant (CD > 0). In period n ∈ {1, ..., i, ...N}, plaintiff n makes a
take-it-or-leave-it offer an to the defendant, which the latter either accepts or rejects. If
he accepts, the plaintiff receives an from the defendant. If he rejects, the plaintiff can go
to trial in period N + 1 together with all the other rejected plaintiffs. With s rejected
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plaintiffs, payoffs from going to trial are:
Π = D/N − CP/s (1)
for each member of the suing coalition and
− (sD/N + CD) (2)
for the defendant.3 Let m be the minimum number of plaintiffs for which Π ≥ 0, i.e.
only a coalition of at least m plaintiffs has a credible threat to sue. We can then prove
the following proposition:
Proposition 1 If there are N plaintiffs, plaintiffs n ∈ {1, ..., i, ..., N −m} settle for
D/N , pivotal plaintiff N−m+1 gets more (mD/N+CD), exploiting the m−1 remaining
plaintiffs who get nothing. Total plaintiff recovery is as in the case without externalities.
The defendant’s incentives to take precaution are undiluted.
Proof. We will first prove that if there are N plaintiffs making take-it-or-leave-it
offers to plaintiffs, parties will always settle out of court. Assume to the contrary that
there will be litigation in equilibrium. This implies that there must exist a plaintiff k
≥ m who observes that m−1 offers before him were rejected and makes an offer ak which
is rejected. Assume that k = N . If the offer of plaintiff N is rejected, there will be a
trial in period N + 1. Hence, the plaintiff’s payoff will be
D/N − CP/m (3)
and the defendant has to pay mD/N + CD.
4 We will now check if it is worthwhile for
the plaintiff to deviate by making an offer aN which is accepted. As the plaintiff has all
the bargaining power he will make an offer such that the defendant becomes indifferent
between accepting and rejecting:
aN = mD/N + CD. (4)
3This setting is identical to Che and Spier (2007), except for the assumption of sequential TIOLI
offers by plaintiffs.
4Note that the plaintiff has already settled with N-m plaintiffs, which reduces his damage payment.
5
As this clearly exceeds the plaintiff’s payoff as member of a suing coalition (3), he will
deviate such that k = N cannot occur in equilibrium.
Next assume that k = N − 1. If the offer aN−1 of plaintiff N − 1 is rejected, there
will be a trial in period N + 1. Given the certainty of trial, the defendant will settle for
D/N with plaintiff N . Adding the liability he faces in court and the cost of litigation,
he pays:
(m+ 1)D/N + CD. (5)
If the offer of plaintiff N − 1 is accepted, plaintiff N will settle for mD/N + CD, just as
we have already shown (4). Therefore, the defendant will accept offer aN−1:
aN−1 + aN = (m+ 1)D/N + CD ⇐⇒ aN−1 = D/N. (6)
As D/N is higher than the plaintiff’s payoff as a member of a suing coalition (3), he
will deviate such that k = N − 1 cannot occur in equilibrium. Working backwards and
arguing inductively, one can see that all plaintiffs k ≥ m make a settlement offer which
is accepted. Hence, there will never be litigation.
In the next step, we will prove that m− 1 plaintiffs will receive a zero payoff. Given
that the case always settles, the number of offers rejected must be less than m. Hence,
there must be at least N − (m− 1) plaintiffs who settle. This implies that there exists
a plaintiff j who observes that N −m plaintiffs before him have settled and makes an
offer which is accepted. Once this offer is accepted, it is clear that there will be no trial.
Therefore, any plaintiff who was rejected so far will receive a zero payoff. The same holds
true for any subsequent plaintiff as any positive settlement offer will be rejected. This
establishes that, in equilibrium, there will be m− 1 plaintiffs, who receive zero payoff.
Finally, we will see that it will always be the last m− 1 plaintiffs who receive a zero
payoff. Assume that the firstm−1 offers are rejected. Then not a single of the subsequent
offers may be rejected if a trial is to be avoided. Indeed we have already shown that in
this case, all plaintiffs n ∈ {m, ..., i, ...,N − 1} settle for D/N , and plaintiff N settles
for mD/N + CD. However, it is clear that this cannot be a Nash equilibrium. If only
one of the first N − (m− 1) plaintiffs gets a zero payoff, he can benefit by undercutting
subsequent plaintiffs.
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The reason plaintiff N − m + 1 is in the position to exploit subsequent plaintiffs is
his pivotal role in the settlement process. By accepting his offer, the defendant can make
absolutely sure there will be no trial. Hence, all subsequent plaintiffs are deprived of
a credible threat to sue. As for the plaintiffs who settled before, it is true that their
decisions put the pivotal plaintiff into his strong bargaining position in the first place.
Yet, at the time when the defendant negotiates with the pivotal plaintiff, the decisions of
those plaintiffs who have previously settled have already been made. Therefore, no prior
plaintiff can skim off part of the exploitation benefit. It is interesting to note that the
plaintiff who extracts the most is an intermediate plaintiff.5 Hence, there is no general
first-mover advantage.
3 Derivative Suits
If a company’s director breaches his fiduciary duties, he can become liable. In this case,
shareholders or groups of shareholders may sue him on behalf of the company (derivative
suit). However, as the claim is technically a claim on behalf the company, damages are
paid to the corporate coffers rather than directly to shareholders. Hence, suing constitutes
a public good as every shareholder benefits relative to his share of the company’s capital,
irrespective of whether he has sued or not. Moreover, the defendant-director can only
"bribe" plaintiffs not to sue. In fact, as the claim belongs to the company, no single
shareholder can dispose of the claim itself. Therefore, "settlement" does not reduce total
liability if the case goes to trial.
We consider N shareholder-plaintiffs who can sue on behalf of the company for a total
amount of D against a single defendant-director. Cost of litigation is fixed on both the
plaintiffs’ (CP > 0) and the defendant’s side (CD > 0). We allow for plaintiffs to hold
different shares in the capital of the company. This requires some adaptations compared
to the model in section 2: In period n ∈ J = {1, ..., i, ...N}, plaintiff n, holding a share
of χn, makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer an to the defendant, which the latter can either
accept or reject. If he accepts, the plaintiff receives an from the defendant. If he rejects,
the plaintiff can go to trial in period N + 1 together with other rejected plaintiffs. With
5Except in the case where m = N = 2, where the first plaintiff is pivotal.
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suing plaintiffs representing a share of σ in the company’s capital and assuming that
plaintiffs share litigation costs according to their relative holdings, the payoff from going
to trial for plaintiff n is:
Πn = χn (D − CP/σ) (7)
if he participates in the suit. If not, because he has either settled or decides to freeride,
his payoff will be Πˆn = χnD. The defendant’s payoff in the event of trial is − (D + CD).
Note that unlike the above, the defendant-director’s liability is not reduced by any of the
prior settlement agreements. We define µ as the minimum share of the capital that a
suing coalition must collectively represent in order to have a credible threat to sue:
µ ≡ inf[σ |Π > 0] (8)
and derive the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If plaintiffs cannot dispose of their claims but only of their right to sue,
cases will go to trial if no single plaintiff can veto litigation (χn < 1− µ for all n ∈ J).
As litigation is costly, total plaintiff recovery will be less than in the benchmark, but the
defendant’s incentives remain undiluted. However, if there exists at least one plaintiff
who can wield veto power (χn > 1 − µ), the defendant settles for D + CD with the first
such plaintiff, while all other plaintiffs receive a zero payoff. Total plaintiff recovery is as
in the benchmark.
Proof. We first show that there will always be litigation if χn < 1− µ for all n ∈ J .
Suppose the opposite is true. In order to avoid litigation, the defendant must settle with
plaintiffs representing more than 1 − µ of shares. This implies, that there must exist a
pivotal plaintiff k who 1) by settling can raise the share above 1 − µ and 2) makes an
offer which is accepted by the defendant. Therefore, the difference between the amount
of settlement which is required in order to avoid litigation, and the amount of prior





χnλn ≤ χk, (9)
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where λn indicates whether plaintiff n settled (λn = 1) or not (λn = 0). As in the previous
assumption, it holds that χk < 1− µ, there must also exist a plaintiff j < k who knows








Suppose k = N is the pivotal plaintiff and let aN be his settlement offer to the defendant.
The defendant knows that if he rejects the offer, the coalition will go to trial, and he has
to pay D + CD to the company.
6 Hence, plaintiff N makes an offer of
aN = D + CD (11)
(maybe a penny less) which is accepted by the defendant. Note, that any equilibrium
strategy by the defendant involving the acceptance of settlement offers must necessarily
be better than rejecting all settlement offers and going to trial:
N∑
n=1
anλn ≤ D + CD. (12)
Inserting (11) into (12) we get:
N−1∑
n=1
anλn +D + CD ≤ D + CD =⇒
N−1∑
n=1
anλn = 0 (13)
which means that none of the accepted prior settlement offers may have been positive.
This cannot occur in equilibrium. Indeed, we will see that plaintiff j who makes plaintiff
N pivotal will always have an incentive to deviate by making an offer aj > 0. Suppose
that j is the plaintiff who directly precedes the pivotal plaintiff, j = N −1. He can either
make an offer of aN−1 = 0 which is accepted or an offer of aN−1 > 0, which is rejected. If




χnλn − χNλN . (14)








6Although there may be some freeriding, it will not prevent litigation. Given the strategy of all other
plaintiffs, the marginal plaintiff who ensures that the suing coalition represents at least a share of µ will
do worse by defecting from the coalition. Hence, defecting will not be part of a Nash equilibrium. This
is a common feature of settings where the provision of the public good constitutes a binary decision.
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Making use of the second inequality in (15) we can see that
σ > µ− (1− λN)χN ≥ µ. (16)
Therefore, the coalition will go to trial and plaintiffN−1 gets a payoff of χN−1 (D − CP/σ) >
χN−1 (D − CP/µ) which is positive by the definition of µ. Hence, plaintiff j deviates. It
follows that j = N − 1 which implies that:




Next suppose that j = N − 2. Once again, he can either make an offer of aN−2 = 0,
which is accepted, or an offer of aN−2 > 0, which is rejected. If he is rejected (λN−2 = 0),




χnλn − χN−1λN−1 − χNλN ≥ 1−
N−1∑
n=1
χnλn − χN . (18)
Making use of (17) we can see that σ > µ. Therefore, the coalition will go to trial and
plaintiff N−2 gets a payoff of χN−2 (D − CP/σ) > χN−2 (D − CP/µ) which is positive by
definition of µ. Hence, plaintiff j deviates. It follows that j = N−2. Working backwards
we can make the argument that each plaintiff n < N either is not in the position to make
plaintiff N pivotal or makes a positive settlement offer which is then rejected. Therefore
plaintiff N cannot be pivotal.
Next suppose that plaintiff k = N−1 is pivotal. If he settles, there will be no litigation.
Hence, his offer of aN−1 = D+CD is accepted, while the offers of all subsequent plaintiffs
n ∈ {k, ..., i, ..., N} will be rejected. But then there must exist a plaintiff j < N − 1 who
makes plaintiff N − 1 pivotal. Using the same argument as before, we see that only offer
aj = 0 will be accepted. Yet, as plaintiff j will derive a positive payoff from litigation, he
will ask for aj > 0 such that k = N − 1. Working backwards we will eventually come to






χn < 1− µ
}
. (19)
Yet, he cannot be pivotal as, even if he settles, there will not be enough settlements in
order to avoid litigation.
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The logic of the argument fails, however, if there exists at least one veto wielding
plaintiff χk > 1 − µ. This can be seen from expression (9). The first such plaintiff will
be pivotal regardless of what the other plaintiffs do. He will settle for D+CD exploiting
all other plaintiffs.
The intuition of the proof is that no plaintiff wants to build the bridge for any sub-
sequent plaintiff to be pivotal. Hence, there will never be enough plaintiffs who settle
in order to avoid litigation. The logic of the argument fails, however, if there exists a
veto wielding plaintiff. He is the one who can guarantee that there will be no trial all by
himself, regardless of whether prior plaintiffs settled or not.
4 No Derivative Suits in Europe
The model might explain the empirical phenomenon that derivative suits are rather wide-
spread in the US while absent in Europe (Grechenig and Sekyra, 2007; Romano, 1991).
Indeed, it predicts that litigation can be avoided if there exists a dominant shareholder
who wields veto power in the sense that all remaining plaintiffs together would not ex-
hibit a credible threat to sue because they should find it too expensive. This plaintiff will
extract the whole damage payment and the director-defendant’s cost of litigation, leaving
nothing to minority shareholders. While it will not often be the case, even in Europe,
that the dominance of a single shareholder is such that he can veto litigation alone, it is
realistic for a relatively small group of blockholders jointly to be in such a position (e.g.
La Porta; Lopez-de-Silanes and A. Shleifer, 1999). As collusion among them is much eas-
ier to organize than in the dispersed shareholder structure of the US, the likely outcome
is that there will be settlements out of court in Europe, while claims will proceed to court
in the US. Interestingly, the model also implies that although minority shareholders do
worse in Europe, the cost of litigation will generally be lower, yet achieving the same level
of deterrence. Whereas the results of Grechenig and Sekyra (2007) crucially depend on
the director-defendant holding most of the bargaining power, our explanation of the ab-
sence of shareholder derivative suits in Europe assumes that all the bargaining power lies
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with the plaintiffs. In this sense, the two models can be considered as complementary.7
5 Conclusion
We considered a setting where the decision of plaintiffs to settle creates a negative exter-
nality on other plaintiffs. Che and Spier (2007) have shown that failure to internalize
this externality can often be exploited by the defendant. Yet, observing differential treat-
ment of plaintiffs does not necessarily mean that they are exploited by the defendant.
If plaintiffs make sequential take-it-or-leave-it offers, we have shown that there exists a
pivotal plaintiff who expropriates some of his fellow plaintiffs. Moreover, if litigation is a
public good, like in the case of derivative suits, parties may fail to settle even under com-
plete information. Finally, the effect offers a theoretical explanation for why we observe
derivative suits in the US but not in Europe.
7Grechenig and Sekyra (2007) argue that the plaintiff is at a disadvantage in settlement negotiations
as he will eventually have to decide whether to accept the defendant’s offer or to bring suit. Therefore,
the defendant has the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. We find this argument unconvincing as
it ignores the possibility of reaching a settlement after a suit is brought. Indeed, bringing suit has little
immediate consequences and parties may well reach a settlement later as litigation cost start to pile up.
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